We consider non zero-sum games where multiple players control the drift of a process, and their payoffs depend on its ergodic behaviour. We establish their connection with systems of Ergodic BSDEs, and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium under the generalised Isaac's conditions. We also study the case of interacting players of different type. MSC: 91A60, 49N70, 93E20
Introduction
The area of non-zero sum stochastic differential games has been a subject of intensive research over the past several decades. It deals with the situation where multiple players are each trying to maximise their payoff, but rewards of all players do not sum up to any constant. The basic aim is to find a Nash equilibrium point -a set of strategies for all players, such that none of them would benefit from unilaterally deviating. The study of the connection between this problem and backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) was pioneered by Hamadène, Lepeltier and Peng in [5] , building up on their previous work on zero-sum games in Hamadène and Lepeltier [7] . Since then it has been discussed in multiple contexts, e.g. games of control and stopping by Karatzas and Li in [11] and risk-sensitive control by El Karoui and Hamadène in [12] . The main goal of the present paper is to prove the existence of an equilibrium in the case where we have two drift controlling players who are ergodic, i.e. they choose their strategies in infinite horizon and optimise the long run average. In a standard fashion (see, e.g. Hamadène and Mu [8] ), we impose the so-called generalised Isaac's condition on the Hamiltonian, in order to ensure the attainability of the infimum simultaneously for both players. We then prove that the existence of a saddle point for the game follows from the existence of a solution to a system of Ergodic BSDEs with continuous coefficients. Using a modified version of Picard iteration (not dissimilar in nature to the fixed point construction used by Hu and Tang in [10] ), along with an array of estimates for solutions of EBSDEs, established in Debussche, Hu and Tessitore [4] and by the authors in [3] , we prove that such a system does admit a solution. We then extend these results to the case of finite or countably many players. As a byproduct of developing the machinery required to deal with ergodic games, we obtain the existence of a solution to a class of EBSDEs with continuous drivers of linear growth. The concluding section is dedicated to asymmetric games, where one player is purely ergodic, and the other also optimises in infinite horizon, but values the present more than the future (i.e. uses discounting). We show that the value of such a game exists, and demonstrate convergence to the ergodic system as we send the discount rate to zero.
Setup
We begin by describing the uncontrolled forward process {X t } t≥0 , the drift of which will be affected by the players in the sequel. Let the dynamics of {X t } t≥0 be governed by the Itô SDE:
where W denotes a standard Brownian motion in R N under the measure P. We need a few preliminary assumptions.
Assumption 1. Conditions to guarantee existence of a unique strong solution to (1):
• The triple (Ω, F , P) is a probability space, {F t } t≥0 is a right-continuous filtration and F t is complete for each t.
• The process {W t } t≥0 is a Brownian motion with the predictable representation property in the filtration {F t } t≥0 .
• The operator A is dissipative and generates a stable semigroup {e tA } t≥0 . In other words, there exist constants µ > 0, M > 0 such that
Ax, x ≤ −µ x 2 and e tA ≤ M e −µt hold for all x ∈ R n and all t ≥ 0. Here and for the rest of the paper · denotes the Euclidean norm (or Frobenius norm for a matrix).
• The map F is uniformly Lipschitz continuous and bounded.
• The matrix σ is invertible.
Remark 1. As we will be considering the ergodic behaviour of (1), under a variety of probability measures, we need to be careful not to complete our filtrations in the usual way. The above requirement is non-standard, but it is easy to see that all the usual existence proofs hold via pasting in time.
The following result is a straightforward application of Grönwall's lemma and the dissipativity condition: Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 is satisfied, then there exists a unique strong solution to the equation (1) . Moreover,
where the constant C depends on M, µ, but is independent of t.
Proof: Given the assumption of Lipschitz continuity, the existence of a strong, square integrable solution to (1) is standard. Fix a constant k > 0. Applying Itô's formula to e kt X t 2 and taking expectations, we obtain
Taking into account Assumption 1 and applying Cauchy-Schwarz, we see that for any ǫ > 0, there exists C ǫ , such that
Then, choosing ǫ < µ and k < 2(µ − ǫ), we arrive at
concluding the proof.
Remark 2. By applying Itô's lemma to X t 4 and using the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can also show that
for some constant C independent of time.
Remark 3. If F (·), the nonlinear part of the drift, is a bounded measurable map, there still exists a solution to (1) in the weak sense. In other words, for any T > 0, there exists 1 a measureP T ∼ P, and anP T -Brownian motionW such that, for t ∈ [0, T ],
and this solution is unique in law (and is consistent for different values of T < ∞, soW is uniquely defined). Moreover, since this solution can be obtained through a measure change from a strong solution to the equation without drift, {W t } t∈[0,T ] has the predictable representation property in the filtration {F t } t∈[0,T ] underP T , for all T . For details see, e.g. Chapters 15 and 18 in [2] .
is continuous for any fixed x.
One way to think about the condition above is as the natural extension of the standard assumptions used in the zero-sum framework to the non zero-sum case. Indeed, consider the case of two players, one maximising and the other minimising a functional
. Then, using a measurable selection argument, one could show that the standard Isaac's condition
For details, see Hamadène and Lepeltier [7] . Given this connection, one can see that (i) in the Assumption 2 is a reasonable generalisation of the Isaac's condition.
Remark 4. We notice that, for fixed u, v, the function H i is Lipschitz in z i . However, Assumption 2 only gives us the existence of a so called "closed loop" control, where the optimal processes u * , v * depend on (z 1 , z 2 ), and only continuity of H i is guaranteed. Therefore the standard method of proving the existence of a solution to the corresponding Ergodic BSDE breaks down.
We should observe that Assumption 2 does not guarantee that either u * or v * are continuous (cf. Mannucci [14] for similar assumptions).
Remark 5. In the game we consider, both players control the drift. In [8] the authors considered the case where the resulting R(u, v) can be unbounded, but is of linear growth with respect to the underlying process {X t } t≥0 . However, since we are in the ergodic framework, we restrict our attention to the bounded case. While Isaac's condition is arguably natural, we should note that there has been work on stochastic differential games without this assumption (see for example Buckdahn, Li and Quincampoix [1] ). Remark 6. One may also notice the similarity between the generalised Isaac's condition and the definition of a saddle point. Indeed, one could think of part (i) of Assumption 2 as ensuring the existence of Nash equilibrium controls on the infinitesimal scale.
Ergodic BSDEs with continuous coefficients and stochastic games
In this section we prove that, under our assumptions, the game has value, that is there exists a Nash equilibrium as defined in the preceding section. We begin by considering two players of ergodic type, then proceed to generalise to the case of n ∈ N ∪ {+∞} players. Finally, we show a connection with PDEs.
Games with two players of ergodic type
In order to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium, the following two-step programme needs to be carried out:
• Assuming there exists a solution to the EBSDE corresponding to control pair (u * , v * ) as defined in Assumption 2, establish its optimality.
• Prove the existence of a unique solution to the EBSDE with continuous coefficients, guaranteeing this assumption holds.
In order to establish the existence of a solution to a one-dimensional ergodic BSDE with driver f , the following set of assumptions on the driver needs to be made:
We begin by stating certain crucial results from the theory of Ergodic BS-DEs. The following theorem establishes existence and uniqueness of solutions. We omit the proof, as it can be easily constructed using the arguments in [4] .
Let the driver f satisfy Assumption 3. Then there exists a solution
for some constant C > 0. There also exists a deterministic function v :
Moreover, the solution is unique in the class of Markovian solutions, for which the Y component is of polynomial growth with respect to X.
We now show that if both players can find a Markovian solution of polynomial growth to their respective EBSDEs with optimal pair of controls (u * , v * ), then by so doing they find a Nash equilibrium.
holds for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < 0, where the pair (u * , v * ) is as in Assumption 2. Moreover, assume there exist two deterministic functions with polynomial growth
is a Nash equilibrium.
Taking expectations with respect to P u,v * ,T , and remembering that λ 1 is a constant, we arrive at
≤ 0 by the definition of (u * , v * ). We recall that Y 1 is of polynomial growth in X, and the latter has all moments under P u,v * uniformly in t (for details see, e.g. [4] ). Thus, taking lim sup on both sides, we obtain
For u = u * the inequality everywhere becomes equality by the definition of the pair (u * , v * ) in Assumption 2. In the same way, we observe J 2 (u * , v * ) = λ 2 ≤ J 2 (u * , v) for any admissible control v, finishing the proof.
Remark 7. The result of Theorem 3 shows that even in the case where admissible controls are allowed to be non-Markovian, the values λ i , i = 1, 2 obtained as solutions to the system (6) are still optimal. In other words, using the generalised Isaac's condition, we can show the existence of "closed loop" or "feedback" controls that are optimal in the larger class of "open loop" or "predictable" controls.
We now proceed to the second step of our programme. We prove that there exists a solution to the system of ergodic BSDEs (6) . The following auxiliary result is a weak version of a comparison theorem for the ergodic values λ, which holds in multiple dimensions.
Then λ i ≤ λ for i = 1, 2.
Proof: Define a measure Q T as follows:
where f (z) = C z +C. Then under Q T , the process {X t } t≥0 is ergodic with some invariant measure µ. Since we only consider Markovian solutions, we know that
for details on Markov representation, see e.g. Fuhrman, Hu and Tessitore [6] ). Then, integrating the
from which we immediately see that
finishing the proof.
There are two apparent ways to attack the problem of proving the existence of a solution to (6):
(i) For any t ≥ 0, equation (6) gives us a map Y i t+1 → Y i t for i ∈ 1, 2. If we integrate with respect to the ergodic measure π for the forward process {X t } t≥0 , we have a new map. Now we know that the solution to (6) is its fixed point. To proceed, we would need to prove certain compactness and continuity properties for this map.
(ii) We could attempt construction of a solution iteratively using a form of Picard iteration.
In this paper we focus on plan (ii). The main result of this section is as follows: 
holds for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < 0. Moreover, there exist deterministic functions with polynomial growth y 1 (x), y 2 (x), such that Y i t = y i (X t ), i = 1, 2 holds P -a.s. for all t ≥ 0.
Proof: We begin by setting Z i,0 ≡ 0 for i = 1, 2. Given a set of Markovian
We define the next iteration as a solution to the EBSDE
where
We note that for all n ≥ 1, the drivers {f i,n } i=1,2 are uniformly Lipschitz in the z component, since
We therefore know that there exists a solution {(Y i,n , Z i,n , λ i,n )} i=1,2 to (7). It remains to show that there exists a convergent subsequence with limit
holds for all n ≥ 1. We can therefore find a subsequence {n k } k∈N , such that λ i,n k → λ i , i = 1, 2 for some {λ i } i=1,2 . One can also show (see Theorem 8 in [3] ), that for all n ≥ 1, there exist deterministic functions
holds for some constant C > 0 independent of n. (As shown in [3] , this constant depends on sup x∈R n F (x) and on the Lipschitz constant of f i,n (x, z) in the z component. The fact that the latter is uniform in n follows from the definition of the Hamiltonian.) Moreover, we have the following gradient estimate:
for i = 1, 2, n ∈ N. Since R N is separable, there exists a dense countable subset B ⊂ R n . We can therefore extract a further subsequence {n k l }, such that
for all x ∈ B, and some v i : B → R. Given (9), we know that the sequence {v i,n } n∈N is locally Lipschitz uniformly in n, and thus we can extend {v i } i=1,2 to the whole of R N by continuity. NB: For the sequel we use n instead of n k l for notational simplicity, assuming we work with this subsequence. We now prove that the sequence {Z i,n } n∈N is Cauchy. It is known (see, e.g. [4] ) that, since Z i,n is Markovian, it has the following representation:
for all t ≥ 0.
Hence, by (9) , we see that
for some constantsC,C that are uniform in t, n. Now, set Y i,n t = v i,n (X t ) for i = 1, 2 and n ∈ N.
For all T ≥ 0, applying Itô's lemma toȲ 2 and taking expectations, we obtain
wheref (t) = f i,n (X t , Z i,n ) − f i,m (X t , Z i,m ) in the notation above. Using the definition off (t), estimate (9) and Remark 2, we see that
where c andc are some constants that do not depend on n, m. Thus, applying Cauchy-Schwartz and the dominated convergence theorem, we conclude that
as n, m → ∞. The other terms in (11) tend to zero by construction, and thus
In other words, there exist limits Z 1 , Z 2 , such that
for all T ≥ 0. It remains to show the driver term is also convergent in the appropriate topology. For all T ≥ 0 we have
By definition of the Hamiltonian,
showing the convergence of the first term in (12) to zero. We recall that convergence in L 2 implies convergence in measure, which in turn implies convergence a.e. for a subsequence. Therefore there exists a subsequence {n k } k∈N , such that Z i,n k → Z i P ⊗ dt − a.e., i = 1, 2.
Recall that ), we conclude that
and convergence of the second term in (12) follows by the dominated convergence theorem. We have shown that
for all T ≥ 0. This concludes the proof.
Remark 8. We can now see why part (ii) in Assumption 2 was necessary. In order to use the BSDE approach, we had to prove that a solution to a certain system of equations exists. We constructed such solution as a limit, and then had to show that the driver terms converged as well. Therefore, continuity of the Hamiltonian (which played the role of the driver) in (z 1 , z 2 ) was naturally required.
Remark 9. One interesting question is the connection between solutions to finite horizon games (i.e. systems of BSDEs with continuous coefficients) and their ergodic counterpart. For a detailed account of the one dimensional Lipschitz case, see Hu, Madec and Richou [9] . In the present context, given that at the optimum the drivers are only continuous, a measure change technique is not available, so the techniques used in [9] cannot be easily transferred. One simple line of attack would be to fix one player's strategy at the ergodic optimum and focus on the long-run behaviour of the other player. This reduces the problem to the known case, but raises more questions than it answers, since the control is no longer closed loop. Thus, even though convergence of the solution is guaranteed (as in [9] ), the interpretation of this system of equations as a stochastic game is lost.
Considering the system of BSDEs with continuous coefficients directly is a challenging task. In particular, as there are no uniqueness results in this context, and measure change techniques are not available, it proves difficult to demonstrate convergence of solutions without significant further exploration of this theory. We leave these questions for future research.
Quick detour into one dimensional EBSDEs
In this section we leave the world of games and control and apply the machinery established above to the case of one dimensional ergodic BSDE with a continuous driver of linear growth (in the z component). We begin by proving an auxiliary lemma that establishes a useful representation of this class of functions. Proof: We first notice that, given that f is of linear growth, there exists a constant C > 0 such that f (x) ≤ C x for all x :
where x ⊤ is the transpose of x. The claim follows immediately.
Remark 10. Notice that we have no continuity assumption on the individual components φ, ψ. One can clearly see that this decomposition is inspired by the structure of the Hamiltonian in the games framework.
Taking into account the result of Lemma 2, we are therefore interested in the equation
where one can find functions φ(·), ψ(·), such that f (x, z) = φ(x, z)z + ψ(x, z), and there exist constants c, C > 0, such that
holds for all x, z ∈ R N . In general, the existence of a solution to (14) does not follow from the standard theorems about EBSDEs, for the driver f (·, ·) may not be Lipschitz. However, the technique developed for the game setup still gives the following result: Then there exists a solution (Y, Z, λ) to the EBSDE (13) . Moreover, there exists a deterministic locally Lipschitz function v :
Proof: We use the iteration method developed in the previous section in the games context. Set Z 0 s ≡ 0, and let (Y n , Z n , λ n ) be a solution to
where the process {Z n−1 s } s≥0 is a known Markovian solution we obtained on the previous iteration. In other words, Z n−1 s = ζ n−1 (X s ) for some deterministic function ζ n−1 : R N → R N . In the notation of Lemma 2, set f n (x, z) = φ(x, ζ n−1 (x))z + ψ(x, ζ n−1 (x)).
We notice that there exist constants c, C > 0, such that |f n (x, 0)| ≤ C, and |f n (x, z) − f n (x, z ′ )| ≤ c z − z ′ , so by Theorem 2 there exists a solution (Y n , Z n , λ n ) to (15) . There also exist deterministic functions y n : R N → R, ζ n : R N → R N , such that Y n s = v n (X s ), Z n s = ζ n (X s ). Moreover, estimates (8) and (9) hold uniformly in n. We can therefore use the diagonalisation procedure on some dense countable subset B ⊂ R N , in order to obtain the function v : B → R, and λ ∈ R, such that v(x) = lim k→∞ v n k (x) for all x ∈ B, and λ = lim k→∞ λ n k for some subsequence {n k } k≥0 . We can then extend v to the entirety of R N by continuity. We then proceed to show convergence of {Z n k } k≥0 in L 2 T (W ) for all T ≥ 0 in exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4. We finally extract a further subsequence that converges P ⊗ dt − a.e., and use the fact that
Using the dominated convergence theorem along with the continuity of f , we conclude the convergence of the driver term.
Remark 11. We notice that the proof above extends naturally to the case of multiple dimensional EBSDEs with an appropriate diagonal boundedness structure. In other words, consider the system
where Z denotes the vector of Z-components. Suppose for all i = 1, . . . , n and for all x ∈ R N , the map z → f i (x, z) is continuous, and for every i, we know |f i (x, z)| ≤ κ(1 + z i ) for some κ > 0. Then the system admits a solution.
Remark 12. Similar to the setting of finite horizon BSDEs with continuous coefficients considered by Lepeltier and San Martin (see [13] ), we do not obtain any uniqueness result. Of course one could only hope for the uniqueness of the ergodic values, since Y + c for any constant c also solves the same equation. The difficulty in applying the standard technique to establish uniqueness for λ's is that this uses a change of measure to remove a drift term of the form [f (X s , Z s ) − f (X s , Z ′ s )]ds. This is not possible in the present framework due to the fact that f (x, ·) is not Lipschitz.
Connection to PDEs
In this section we briefly show the relation between Theorem 4 and the existence of a solution to the following system of elliptic ergodic HJB equations:
where u * (x) = u * (∇y 1 (x)σ, ∇y 2 (x)σ), v * (x) = v * (∇y 1 (x)σ, ∇y 2 (x)σ), the functions y i (·), i = 1, 2 are as in Theorem 4, and L is a linear operator defined as
We notice that if we define the transition semigroup {P t } t≥0 associated with the process {X t } t≥0 by
for all measurable functions φ : R N → R of polynomial growth, then L is the generator of {P t } t≥0 . Similarly to Debussche, Hu and Tessitore [4] , we adopt the following definition: (iii) For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , for all x ∈ R N , and for i = 1, 2,
where u * , v * are as above.
We therefore automatically have the following result:
Theorem 6. Suppose conditions in Theorem 4 are satisfied. Then {(y i , λ i )} i=1,2 is a unique mild solution to the system (16). Conversely, if {(ỹ i ,λ i )} i=1,2 is a mild solution to (16), then, setting Y i t =ỹ i (X t ), i = 1, 2, we obtain a solution to the system of EBSDEs (6).
Games with n > 2 players
In this section we consider a game between n ∈ N ∪ {∞} ergodic players. As in the case of two players, we show that the existence of a solution to a certain system of ergodic BSDEs guarantees the existence of a saddle point (provided a version of generalised Isaac's condition is assumed). We then proceed to prove the former. We show that the scenario of finitely many players is a relatively straightforward extension of Theorem 4, but extra care is required for the countable case.
Let u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) be the vector of controls, such that (ω, t) → u t (ω) is a predictable process with values in a separable metric space U = U 1 × · · · × U n . Denote z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ R n×N . We define the Hamiltonian functions
where, similar to the two player case, L i : R N × U → R, i = 1 . . . n are measurable cost functions Lipschitz in x, and the function R : U → R N corresponds to the control of the drift by players through the change of measure P u,v,T := ρ u,v T P, where
Infinite player games
For a countable number of players additional care is needed. First, condition (ii) in Assumption 4 needs to be reformulated. This is due to the fact that in infinite dimensions not all norms are equivalent, and therefore in order to have a notion of continuity, we need to specify the topology on infinite dimensional vectors z. Let θ i denote the i-th component of the vector θ, and define L 2 ǫ,loc := predictable processes θ :
Given the fact that constants in the estimate (10) do not depend on time or the number of iteration, we know that there exists a constant C > 0 such that
holds uniformly in i, n. Hence Z n ∈ L 2 ǫ,loc for all n ≥ 0. It is clear that componentwise convergence of Z n to Z in L 2 T (W ) for all T > 0 guarantees convergence of Z n to Z in L 2 ǫ,loc . We also notice that, in the proof of Theorem 4 we use continuity of the vector of Hamiltonians H * for each component separately. Therefore, the infinite dimensional analogue of (i) in Assumption 4 remains exactly the same, while (ii) becomes
Secondly, the construction of a convergent subsequence for the vector of ergodic values λ k needs modification. This is due to the fact that infinite dimensional cubes are not compact. However, the result of Lemma 1 clearly holds, ensuring that each component λ i,k lies in a compact (uniformly in k), and thus we can use a diagonalisation procedure to construct a limit λ. Using (ii) instead of (ii), the rest of the proof remains the same.
Remark 13. Even though the topology L 2 ǫ,loc looks artificial, it has an intuitive interpretation. As pointed out in Remark 6, the generalised Isaac's condition is an equivalent of Nash equilibrium on the infinitesimal scale. Hence the Hamiltonians {H i } i≥1 in some sense represent "local values" for each player. We also note that the vector {Z t } t≥0 can be seen as a vector of strategies, since it determines the values of optimal controls {u * t } t≥0 . Therefore continuity of {H i } i≥1 in z ∈ L 2 ǫ,loc means that, when finitely many "neighbours" (the term can be made rigorous if we put a graph structure on the space of agents) of player i ∈ N ∪ {∞} perturb their strategies only slightly, the change in his local value will be insignificant as well, even if distant agents make substantial changes.
Further generalisations may include the case of infinite dimensional forward process, the presence of Lévy noise, as well as the introduction of time periodicity. Given that the corresponding existence and uniqueness results were established in [3] (for the case where X takes values in a separable Hilbert spaces), we expect that all the results of the present paper should still hold true.
Given the existence result for a game between countably many players, the next natural step would be to look at ergodic mean-field type games. The difficulty with doing this is the continuity assumption on the Hamiltonian, which depends on the topology on z. Since our result is quite generic, it allows for the introduction of additional dependancies between policies of various players, provided that we still have the corresponding version of the generalised Isaac's condition.
Stochastic games with asymmetric agents
In this section we consider a game between two players of different type. The main goal is to understand whether there is a fundamental difference between an ergodic player (as defined above), and one who discounts the future as the discount rate becomes negligible. We define the payoff structure as follows:
where α is some positive constant. In the sequel we will be calling the player of the first type 'ergodic', and of the second 'discounting'. We begin by proving an analogue of Theorem 3 for this case:
Taking the lim sup on both sides, we obtaiñ
and the equality holds for v = v * .
Theorem 9. The system (18) admits a Markovian solution in the sense of Theorem 8.
Sketch of the proof:
Since the rigorous proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 4, we only outline the minor differences. Our first aim is to construct a solution to the system (18) using Picard iteration (7) . Notice that for a fixed α > 0, the uniform estimates (8) and (9) hold for the ergodic BSDE as before, while for the discounted one, (8) is replaced by |v 2,n (x)| ≤ C/α, |v 2,n (x) − v 2,n (0)| ≤ C(1 + x 2 ), where the constant C > 0 is independent of n and α (for details see Theorem 8 in [3] ). This allows us to follow the rest of the proof of Theorem 4 with only slight modifications.
We are now interested in what happens when we send the discount rate α to zero. The idea is to extract a convergent subsequence from a sequence {α n } n∈N and then study the limiting object. We begin by showing the following result: Proof: We know that, by construction, the functions y αn (·) andỹ αn (·) are locally Lipschitz, uniformly in n. Also, |y αn (x)| ≤ C(1 + x 2 ), |ỹ αn (x) −ỹ αn (0)| ≤ C(1 + x 2 ) holds for all x ∈ R N . By Lemma 1 we also know that {λ αn } n≥1 lie in a compact. We can therefore use the diagonalisation procedure to construct the limit on a dense subset of R N (e.g. Q N ), and then extend by continuity to the entire space.
Using arguments identical to the those in the proof of Theorem 4, we conclude that as the discount rate of the second player goes to zero, we can extract a subsequence such that J 1,αn (x 0 , u * , v * ) = λ αn → λ, α n J 2,α (x 0 , u * , v * ) = α nỹ αn (x 0 ) →λ, and we can find (λ,λ) by solving the following system:
, v * (Z s ,Z s )) −λ]ds − T tZ s dW s . This is in line with our intuition. Indeed, we know that for the case of one player (i.e. a standard optimal control problem), the EBSDE is obtained a a limit of discounted infinite horizon BSDEs.
